PRE-EMPTING AN YENAN IN DANTEWADA

B.RAMAN


The current attrition rate in our counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists favours the Maoists. The State is on the defensive and is not making headway in its operations against them. This would be evident from the fact that more personnel of the security forces are being killed than Maoists, more weapons are being captured by the Maoists from the security forces than the other way round and except in Andhra Pradesh , in the other affected States the Government has not succeeded in re-asserting its control over areas which are claimed to have been "liberated" by the Maoists.

2. One hundred and seventy security forces personnel were killed as against 108 Maoists during the first five months of 2010. 312 security forces personnel were killed as against 294 Maoists during 2009.During 2008, 214 security forces personnel and an equal number of Maoists were killed.

3.During the first five months of 2010, six States have suffered fatalities in the security forces at the hands of Maoists----Chattisgarh (103 ), West Bengal (32), Orissa (17), Jharkand (10), Bihar (6), and Maharashtra (2). The same six States suffered fatalities in 2009 too----- Chattisgarh ( 121), Jharkand (67), Maharashtra ( 52), Orissa (32), Bihar (25 ), and West Bengal (15). While the ground situation has remained as serious in Chattisgarh as it was in 2009, it has deteriorated in West Bengal. There has been a downward trend in Jharkand, Bihar, Orissa and Maharashtra. It is doubtful whether the downward trend in these States can be attributed to an improvement in the performance of the security forces. The security forces in Chattisgarh and West Bengal have been more proactive in countering the Maoists than in the past and the Maoists have stepped up their operations in these two States to discredit the security forces by beating back their stepped-up operations. Their successful operations against the security forces in Chattisgarh and West Bengal have brought them dramatic publicity dividends and succeeded in discrediting the efficacy of the counter-insurgency capability of the security forces.

4. Andhra Pradesh, once a hotbed of Maoist activity, has a unique record of no fatalities of security forces during 2010 and 2009 and only one in 2008. If Andhra Pradesh can prevail over the Maoists, there is no reason why others can’t. At the same time, one has to realize that the Government in Chattisgarh faces certain difficulties the like of which no other Maoist-affected State has faced. Of all the affected States, it has had the least economic development. Its road infrastructure is very poor. It has a large forest cover which favours the Maoists. Compared to the Andhra Pradesh Police, the police of Chattisgarh faces serious deficiencies in manpower and counter-insurgency capacity. It has to depend more on central police forces than its own force for the fight against the Maoists. In Andhra Pradesh, it is the local police which played the leadership role. In Chattisgarh, the leadership role is being played by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). The role of the local police has been marginal. The responsibility for operational planning and other initiatives is largely in the hands of the CRPF, with the local police rarely consulted in the matter.

5. The ultimate outcome of our counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists will be decided in the Dantewada district Chattisgarh, which has become the Yenan of the Indian Maoists . After the failure of the Soviet model and the Long March to achieve the capture of political power in a predominantly rural country like China, Mao Zedong and his lieutenants embarked on the Yenan model, which ultimately led to success in 1949. Yenan is in the Shaanxi province. In his 1971 book titled “The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China”, Mark Selden describes the Yenan Way as the "discovery of concrete methods for linking popular participation in the guerrilla struggle with a wide ranging community attack on rural problems.” The Shaanxi province, one of the most drought and famine affected areas of China, provided to the Chinese Maoists an ideal base for testing their theory of exploiting mass rural discontent for creating an armed struggle against the urban areas.

6.If Yenan saw the beginning of the road of success of the Chinese Revolution, the Dantewada area of the state of Chattisgarh is looked upon by the India Maoists as an ideal base for exploiting tribal discontent to create a revolutionary fervour as a prelude to the capture of political power through an armed struggle waged from the impoverished rural areas. The focus of our counter-insurgency efforts has to be centred in the Dantewada area of Chattisgarh. The Maoists’ dream of capturing political power by exploiting rural/tribal discontent has to be countered through an innovative counter-insurgency programme to deprive the Maoist leadership of the support of the rural/ tribal masses. Strengthening the capability of the police to neutralize the Maoist leadership has to be combined with programmes to address simultaneously the grievances and problems of the masses in order to prevent the flow of volunteers to the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army of the Maoists.

6. Strengthening the capability of the police calls for measures to improve rural policing and rural intelligence collection, crash development of the road infrastructure and new training methods, which would encourage and enable the police to operate in autonomous squads instead of in top-heavy formations. Programmes to address the grievances and problems of the masses would call for energetic political initiatives to promote economic development and a feeling of social justice.

7. The recent spectacular successes of the Maoists have attracted the attention of the international community. From the questions posed to Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, our National Security Adviser, at the Asian security conference currently being held in Singapore, it is evident that sections of the community of analysts in other countries have started posing questions regarding the security of India’s nuclear arsenal should India be unable to reverse the successes of the Maoists.

Shivshankar Menon's Address - [412 KB]

Read the prepared version of Shivshankar Menon's Address as PDF.

The NSA has explained why the Maoists do not pose a threat to our nuclear arsenal.

• It is a purely rural-based insurgency with very little support in the urban areas.
• It is purely an Indian movement with an Indian agenda and not a global movement with a global agenda.
• Its targets till now have been its perceived class enemies, the security forces and alleged collaborators of the security forces. Barring its attacks on the railway network in different areas, it has not so far attacked strategic targets like critical infrastructure.
• Its capability for urban-centric operations is very limited.
• Its tribal recruits from the rural and forest areas will stick out like a sore-thumb in urban areas.
• It has not so far showed much interest in the exploitation of the Internet for its operations like the jihadi terrorists.
• Since it recruits mainly from the semi-literate or illiterate tribal communities, Internet has no attraction for them.
• It has not shown much interest in typical terrorist operations such as aviation or maritime terrorism. It is old insurgency still inspired and influenced by Mao’s Yenan model and not new insurgency.

8. Despite this, our intelligence and security agencies should closely monitor its evolution in order to look for evidence of its planning to adopt a mix of rural insurgency and urban terrorism. ( 6-6-10)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Top Maoist Nabbed

KOZHIKODE: Maoist movement in South India suffered a severe jolt with the arrest of Pramod alias Nandakumar alias Ranganna, the state committee secretary of the CPI (Maoist) in Karnataka.

Nandakumar, who hails from Kannur district, joined the Peoples War Group in Karnataka a decade ago. He was arrested from Hyderabad on June 1 where he had apparently gone to meet senior Maoist leaders.

He was later handed over to the Karnataka police.

Saketh Rajan alias Prem, the charismatic state secretatary of the Karnataka unit of the CPI (Maoist) was killed by the police in an encounter in 2005. Sende Rajamouli alias Naveen, the politburo member of the party, was holding the charge of the state secretary when he was arrested by the Andhra police in Kollam in June 2007. He was later killed.

Nandakumar was elected the state secretary of the party after the killing of Rajamouli at a meeting in August 2007.

Kerala police are in the dark about the operations of Nandakumar in Karnataka and Kerala.

He has been described as a Maoist leader hailing from Chithradurga in the lookout notice brought out by the Karnataka police. He has been signing the statements issued by the Karnataka unit of the CPI (Maoist) as Gangadhara.

The Karnataka unit of the CPI (Maoist) has been passing through a bad patch after the split in the party in 2008.

Maoist activities in Karnataka regained momentum after the central committee decided to form a new guerrilla zone that include areas in Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.

It is believed that Nandakumar went to Hyderabad to discuss strategies related to the guerrilla zone with the top leadership.

Maoist arms dump recovered

Markapuram (Prakasam): The police on Friday recovered a Maoist arms dump in the jungle adjacent to Prakasam-Guntur border.

The dump was found in the area under Pullala Cheruvu mandal of Prakasam district.

Markapuram officer on special duty, Mr K. Satyanarayana, said that the Vinukonda police had seized the dump that contained spare parts used for the manufacturing of guns.

Earlier, the police personnel had recovered the spare parts of rocket launchers in the same area after the Maoists leader Tech Madhu had surrendered.

Army meet on Maoist Fight

NISHIT DHOLABHAI

New Delhi, June 4: Army sources today said some units in Jammu and Kashmir had been told to be “on standby” and be ready to leave for Maoist-hit central India at short notice if such an order came. The sources, however, clarified that the Centre’s current policy of not deploying the army in the battle against the Maoists still stood, and that any new strategy had to be cleared by the cabinet committee on security. “As of now there is no decision to deploy the army. Even the defence minister has said that unless the cabinet committee on security approves (such a move), nothing can be said,” an army source said. A cabinet meeting, scheduled yesterday, was cancelled without any reason being cited. Nor was the cabinet committee on security meeting held. Army sources said a series of meetings was held at the Eastern Command headquarters today to discuss the anti-Maoist strategy. Government sources added that a Rashtriya Rifles battalion could be the one to be moved from Jammu and Kashmir to central India. It’s not clear what the army’s role will be if it is deployed in the Maoist zone. The Centre’s strategy is to secure major routes in Chhattisgarh and, if the cabinet committee on security allows it, even the army’s special forces could be sent to de-mine and secure roads and vital infrastructure, the government sources said. Any move to send the army after the Maoists will attract protests from civil society organisations and even from sections within the government. Even today, many MPs who called on Union home minister P. Chidambaram advised against army deployment against the rebels. There are 48 CRPF battalions in nine Maoist-affected states, of which 14 are in Chhattisgarh alone. However, the recent setbacks suffered by the paramilitary forces have prompted the government to rethink its strategy. Jharkhand is under President’s rule and, as its governor said on Thursday, the government has decided to continue with the anti-Maoist operations there.

OPERATION GREEN HUNT: COST OF BEING CASUAL

By Divya Kumar Soti

Dantewada has emerged as a disaster zone over last few months for security forces and their attempts at curbing Maoist violence. The massacre of CRPF troopers in Dantewada and recent landmine blast targeting a passenger bus carrying Special Police Officers (SPOs) triggered heated debates in New Delhi as to approach towards Maoist menace; bringing the issue to national centre stage. Much had been happening over last few years in jungles in Central India-which are infamous since pre-historic times of Ramayana when Lord Rama fought with menace of barbarians in Dandakaranya and more recently when British had tough times in quelling the menace of ‘Thugs’ in 19^th Century- which went unnoticed and now throws a grave challenge for India’s security forces as is evident from outcomes of Operation Green Hunt; a much publicized offensive launched by Centre to curb the Maoist violence.

The roots of unexpected outcomes of OP Green hunt lies in our national attitude towards

Maoist problem and our history of political bewilderment in early phases of any internal security challenge. The blowing up of railway tracks, looting of warehouses in Central India by Maoists were always considered as minor incidents by Centre. The strategists in New Delhi never expected that Maoists will ever target security forces in such big way nor was it seen in most distant dreams that fighters of so called ‘people’s war’ will target civilians. The Maoist problem never attracted as much attention and resources as the insurgencies in J&K or North-East. Maoists were always considered to be poorly trained unsophisticated chaps in comparison to well trained terrorist groups active in Kashmir valley. Sadly, this misconception still persists in our sub-conscious minds. OP Green Hunt was launched without carrying out a proper assessment of threats involved and objectives of operation were vague. This also underlines absence of a broader strategy and a clear mandate for security forces which renders talk of ‘tactical blunders’ by forces a rather inapplicable conjecture. Actually it was nothing but a massive patrolling exercise inspired by a similar one previously carried out in Lalgarh in West Bengal. It was supposed that once troops will establish camps and will start tracking though the forests, Maoists will give up and will come to table. It was also presumed that sight of Central Forces will boost confidence in tribal population thus diffusing the information vacuum. Before launching OP Green Hunt, Ministry of Home Affairs had not secured any guarantee from concerned State Governments with regard to proper co-operation. Moreover, offensive in each State remained a distinct affair. So, Op Green Hunt is not a centralized affair and has no unified command.

Dantewada incident throws light on casual approach with which OP Green Hunt is being conducted. Although, much has been written and said about reasons behind painful massacre of CRPF Company, a more candid effort is attempted in following lines. The CRPF convoy was very badly configured. Usually a forward clearing party moves ahead to look for any mines or ambush in such a zone. The main convoy shall maintain a gap of 100-200 meters from clearing party. This was not the case with ill fated convoy. The company was moving on vague information of Maoist presence.In Dantewada jungles, guerilla movements are too agile. Information received six hours back may be stale for conducting a localized operation. But this does not mean that intelligence is a useless commodity as Chattisgarh DGP told a TV News Channel after the incident. He said that- “There was no intelligence failure. This is a battle zone. Intelligence in general sense does not matter much. We develop it on field and rely more on force than on intelligence.”

There is a difference between intelligence failure and miscarriage of intelligence. What is needed is not plain intelligence but real time intelligence. In today’s circumstances, Central forces are not in the position of ‘developing intelligence during operation’ in a region like Bastar. This highlights the urgent need of aerial reconnaissance so that that raw information can be readily verified.

The massacre of CRPF Company was attributed to ‘tactical blunders’. Subjectively speaking this is true to a great extent but objectively, the flaws in whole anti-naxal strategy are to be blamed. The whole debacle depicts how casually things were taken and how casually troops operate on bad briefs.

(Divya Kumar Soti is a security affairs analyst and may be reached at writing2divya@gmail.com)

Surat police nabs suspected Maoist

Surat Police arrested a suspected Maoist here on Monday.

The detained Maoist ultra is known by three names - Srinivas, Kishore and Sagar.

According to the police, Srinivas was arrested under Unlawful Activities Prevention Act for his past activities as office-bearer of the banned Peoples War Group before it merged with MCC and other groups as CPI (Maoist).

He was staying in the Godasar area of Surat for the past eight years with his wife and son.rinivas is being sent to Surat for further investigation.

Maoist rebels in recent months have stepped up attacks in retaliation to the joint operations launched by central paramilitary and state police outfits to flush them out of their jungle bases.

The Maoists are active in rural areas of central and eastern India and often attack railway lines and mining operations to cripple economic activity, such as the transportation of coal to power and steel plants.he rebel movement started as a peasant revolt in Naxalbari village in West Bengal in 1967, giving Maoists the local name of "Naxals" or "Naxalites".

The rebels say they are fighting for the rights of the poor and marginal farmers and landless labourers. (ANI)